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But from this faculty of knowledge Kant still separates the implicit， the thing-in-itself， so that the universality and necessity are all the time a subjective conditionment of knowledge merely， and reason with its universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of the truth.(5) For it requires perception and experience， a material empirically given in order， as subjectivity， to attain to knowledge. As Kant says， these form its “constituent parts”； one part it has in itself， but the other is empirically given.(6) When reason desires to be independent， to exist in itself and to derive truth from itself， it becomes transcendent； it transcends experience because it lacks the other constituent， and then creates mere hallucinations of the brain. It is hence not constitutive in knowledge but only regulative； it is the unity and rule for the sensuous manifold. But this unity on its own account is the unconditioned， which， transcending experience， merely arrives at contradictions. In the practical sphere alone is reason constitutive. The critique of reason is consequently not the knowing of objects， but of knowledge and its principles， its range and limitations， so that it does not become transcendent.(7) This is an extremely general account of what we shall now consider in its separate details.

In dealing with this matter Kant adopts the plan of first considering theoretic reason， the knowledge which relates to outward objects. In the second place he investigates the will as self-actualization； and， in the third place， the faculty of judgment， the special consideration of the unity of the universal and individual； how far he gets in this matter we shall likewise see. But the critique of the faculty of knowledge is the matter of main importance.

1. Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft (sixth edition， Leipzig， 1818)， pp. 4， 11， 13， 93.

2. Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft， pp. 3-5.

3. Ibidem， Preface， pp. xviii.， xix.

4. Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft， pp. 8， 9， 75， 77， 15.

5. Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft， pp. 255， 256.

6. Ibidem， p. 107.

7. Ibidem， pp. 497， 498； Kritik der prakt. Vernunft (fourth edition， Riga， 1797)， p. 254； Kritik der Urtheilskraft (third edition， Berlin， 1799)， Preface， p. v.

Section Three： Recent German Philosophy C. Fichte.

Fichte created a great sensation in his time； his philosophy is the Kantian philosophy in its completion， and， as we must specially notice， it is set forth in a more logical way. He does not pass beyond the fundamentals of Kant's philosophy， and at first regarded his own philosophy as no more than a systematic working out of the other.(1) In addition to these systems of philosophies， and that of Schelling， there are none. Any that pretend to be such merely pick out something from these， and over this they fight and wrangle among themselves. Ils se sont battus les flanes， pour être de grands hommes. For in those times there were in Germany many systems of philosophy， such as those of Reinhold， Krug， Bouterweck， Fries， Schulze， &c.； but in them there is only an extremely limited point of view， combined with boastfulness - a strange medley of stray thoughts and conceptions or facts which I find within me. But their thoughts are all derived from Fichte， Kant， or Schelling - that is in so far as there are thoughts there present at all.

Or else some slight modification is added， and this for the most part merely consists in making the great principles barren， what points in them were living are destroyed， or else subordinate forms are changed， whereby another principle is said to be set forth， though when we look closer we find that these principles are but the principles of one of those philosophies that have gone before.

This may serve as a justification for my not speaking further of all these philosophies； any exposition of them would be no more than a demonstration that everything in them is taken from Kant， Fichte， or Schelling， and that the modification in form is only the semblance of a change， while really it indicates a deterioration in the principles of those philosophies.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born on the 19th of May， 1762， at Rammenau， near Bischoffswerda， in Upper Lusatia. He studied at Jena， and for some time was a private tutor in Switzerland. He wrote a treatise on Religion， termed a “Critique of all Revelation，” where the Kantian phraseology is employed throughout - so much so that it was thought to be the work of Kant. After this he was in 1793 summoned to Jena by Goethe as Professor of Philosophy， which appointment he， however， resigned in the year 1799， on account of an unpleasantness which had arisen through his essay “On the ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World.” For Fichte published a journal in Jena， and a paper in it which was by someone else was regarded as atheistical. Fichte might have kept silence， but he published the above-mentioned essay as an introduction to the article. The authorities wished an investigation to be made into the matter. Then Fichte wrote a letter which contained threats， and respecting it Goethe said that a Government ought not to allow itself to be threatened. Fichte now taught privately for some time in Berlin； in 1805 he became professor at Erlangen， and in 1809 at Berlin， at which place he died on the 27th January， 1814.(2)We cannot here deal more particularly with the details of his life.