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The philosophy of Kant， which we have now more parcularly to consider， made its appearance at the same time as the above. While Descartes asserted certainty to be the unity of thought and Being， we now have the consciousness of thought in its subjectivity， i.e. in the first place， as determinateness in contrast with objectivity， and then as finitude and progression in finite determinations. Abstract thought， as personal conviction is that which is maintained as certain； its contents are experience， but the methods adopted by experience are once more formal thought and argument. Kant turns back to the standpoint of Socrates； we see in him the freedom of the subject as we saw it with the Stoics， but the task in respect of content is now placed on a higher level. An endless aiming at the concrete is required for thought， a filling up in accordance with the rule which completion prescribes， which signifies that the content is itself the Idea as the unity of the Notion and reality. With Jacobi thought， demonstration， does not in the first place reach beyond the finite and conditioned， and in the Second place， even when God is likewise the metaphysical object， the demonstration is really the making Him conditioned and finite； in the third place the unconditioned， what is then immediately certain， only exists in faith， a subjectively fixed point of view but an unknowable one， that is to say an undetermined， indeterminable， and consequently an unfruitful one. The standpoint of the philosophy of Kant， on the contrary， is in the first place to be found in the fact that thought has through its reasoning got so far as to grasp itself not as contingent but rather as in itself the absolute ultimate. In the finite， in connection with the finite， an absolute standpoint is raised which acts as a connecting bond； it binds together the finite and leads up to the infinite. Thought grasped itself as all in all， as absolute in judgment； for it nothing external is authoritative， since all authority can receive validity only through thought. This thought， determining itself within itself and concrete， is， however， in the second place， grasped as subjective， and this aspect of subjectivity is the form which from Jacobi’s point of view is predominant； the fact that thought is concrete Jacobi has on the other hand for the most part set aside. Both standpoints remain philosophies of subjectivity； since thought is subjective， the capacity of knowing the absolute is denied to it. To Kant God cannot on the one hand be found in experience； He can neither be found in outward experience - as Lalande discovered when he swept the whole heavens and found no God - nor can He be discovered within； though no doubt mystics and enthusiasts can experience many things in themselves， and amongst these God， i.e. the Infinite. On the other hand Kant argues to prove the existence of God， who is to him an hypothesis necessary for the explanation of things， a postulate of practical reason. But in this connection another French astronomer made the following reply to the Emperor Napoleon： “Je n’ai pas eu besoin de cette hypothèse.” According to this the truth underlying the Kantian philosophy is the recognition of freedom. Even Rousseau represented the absolute to be found in freedom； Kant has the same principle， but taken rather from the theoretic side. The French regard it from the side of will， which is represented in their proverb： "Il a la tête près du bonnet.” France possesses the sense of actuality， of promptitude； because in that country conception passes more immediately into action， men have there applied themselves more practically to the affairs of actuality. But however much freedom may be in itself concrete， it was as undeveloped and in its abstraction that it was there applied to actuality； and to make abstractions hold good in actuality means to destroy actuality. The fanaticism which characterized the freedom which was put into the hands of the people was frightful. In Germany the same principle asserted the rights of consciousness on its own account， but it has been worked out in a merely theoretic way. We have commotions of every kind within us and around us， but through them all the German head quietly keeps its nightcap on and silently carries on its operations beneath it.

Immanuel Kant was born at K？nigsberg in 1724， and there studied theology to begin with； in the year 1755 he entered upon his work as an academic teacher； in 1770 he became professor of logic， and in 1801 he died at K？nigsberg on the 12th of February， having almost attained his eightieth year (Tennemann’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie by Wendt， § 380， pp.

465， 466)， without ever having left his native town.