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13. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 214， 215， § 3； De ipsa natura sive de vi insita， § 11， p. 55；Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances (Op. T. II. P. I)， pp. 50， 53.

14. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 79， 121， 234-237， 280， 295； Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain， Bk. II. chap. xiii. § 15， 17， pp. 106， 107.

15. Leibnitz： Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain， Bk. II. chap. xii. § 7， pp. 102， 103；chap. xxi. § 72， p. 170； chap. xxiv. § 1， p. 185.

16. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. p. 39； Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain， Bk. III. chap. vi.

§ 24， p. 278； § 39， p. 290.

17. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. II. p. 60； Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain， Bk. II. chap.

xxiii. § 23， p. 181.

18. Leibnitzii Principia philosophim， § 65-71， p. 28； Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 3， 4， pp. 32， 33.

19. Leibnitzii Principia philosophim， § 29-31， p. 24； Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 5， p.

34； Essais de Th6odic6e， T. I. P. 1. § 44， p. 115.

20. Leibnitz ： Priucipes de la nature et de la grace， § 7， p. 36.

21. Leibnitz： Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 8， p. 35； Principia philosophi？， § 43-46， p.

25.

22. Leibnitz： Essais de Théodicée， T. I. P. I. § 6-8， pp. 83-85； Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 10， p. 36.

23. Leibnitz： Essais de Théodicée， T. I. P. I. § 20， pp. 96， 97； § 32， 33， pp. 106， 107； T. II. P.

II. § 153， pp. 57， 58； § 378， pp. 256， 257.

24. Leibnitzii Causa Dei asserta per justitiam ejus (Essais de Théodicée， T. II.)， § 34-39， pp.

385， 386.

25. Leibnitz： Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 3， p. 33； Premier éclaircissement du système de la communication des substances， p. 70.

26. Leibnitz： Second et troisième éclaircissemens du système de la communication des substances， pp. 71-73.

27. Leibnitzii Principia philosophi？， § 82， p. 30； Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 11， p.

36.

28. Leibnitz： Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances， pp. 54， 55.

29. Leibnitzii Principia philosophi？， § 90， p. 31； Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 12， 13， pp. 36， 37； § 15， pp. 37， 38.

30. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 75， 76.

31. Leibnitzii Principia philosoph.， § 58-62， p. 27； Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 46， 47.

32. Leibnitz： Essais de Théodicée， T. I. P. I. § 9， pp. 85， 86.

33. Leibnitz： Principes de la nature et de la grace， § 12， 13， pp. 36， 37； Oper. T. II. P. I. p. 337.

34. Leibnitz： Essais de Théodicée， T. II. P. III. § 291， pp. 184， 185； T. I. P. I. § 50， p. 119.

Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding Chapter I. - The Metaphysics of the Understanding C 2. WOLFFThe philosophy of Wolff is directly connected with that of Leibnitz， for really it is a pedantic systematization of the latter， for which reason it is likewise called the Leibnitz-Wolffian system of philosophy. Wolff attained to great distinction in mathematics and made himself famous by his philosophy as well； the latter was for long predominant in Germany. In Wolff， as a teacher dealing with the understanding， we find a systematic exposition of the philosophic element present in human conceptions as a whole. As regards his connection with German culture generally， great and immortal praise is more especially due to him； before all others he may be termed the teacher of the Germans. We may indeed say that Wolff was the first to naturalize philosophy in Germany.

Tschirnhausen and Thomasius likewise participated in this honour， for the special reason that they wrote upon Philosophy in the German language. In regard to the matter of the philosophy of Tschirnhausen and Thomasius we have not much to say； it is so-called healthy reason - there is in it the superficial character and the empty universality always to be found where a beginning is made with thought. In this case the universality of thought satisfies us because every thing is present there， just as it is present in a moral maxim which has， however， no determinate content in its universality. Wolff， then， was the first to make， not exactly Philosophy， but thoughts in the form of thought， into a general possession， and he substituted this in Germany for mere talk originating from feeling， from sensuous perception， and from the ordinary conception. This is most important from the point of view of culture， and yet it does not really concern us here， excepting in so far as the content in this form of thought has caused itself to be recognized as Philosophy. This philosophy， as a philosophy of the understanding， became the ordinary culture of the day； in it， determinate， intelligent thought is the fundamental principle， and it extends over the whole circle of objects which fall within the region of knowledge. Wolff defined the world of consciousness for Germany， and for the world in general， in the same wide sense in which we may say that this was done by Aristotle. What distinguishes him from Aristotle is that in so doing the point of view that he adopted was that of the understanding merely， while Aristotle treated the subject speculatively.

The philosophy of Wolff is hence no doubt built on foundations laid by Leibnitz， but yet in such a manner that the speculative interest is quite eliminated from it. The spiritual philosophy， substantial in a higher sense， which we found emerging first in Boehme， though still in a peculiar and barbarous form， has been quite lost sight of， and has disappeared without leaving any traces or effects in Germany； his very language was forgotten.